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MIDCOURSE CORRECTIONS 
Listings, Leases, and Liabilities 
Roger Bernhardt 
Introduction 
The decision in Blickman Turkus, LP v MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 CA4th 
858, 76 CR3d 325 (reported at p 118), could have been a rich source of guidance for attorneys 
interested in commercial brokerage matters, since the attorneys raised some questions about 
brokers’ commission rights and liabilities. Instead, however, because the court begins in the 
middle of the case and then spends most of its lengthy opinion on what appear to be pleading 
rather than substantive issues, I fear that the parties alone will gain very much from reading it. 
That makes this column mostly one on what might have been (with the facts recited being 
derived as much from a reading of the parties’ briefs as from the court’s opinion). 
The Commission 
The litigation was commenced by a cooperating broker for its share of part of a commission it 
claimed was fully earned. The original listing agreement that the landlord had negotiated with its 
own broker to find a tenant provided that one half of the commission would be paid when a lease 
was initially executed and the other half when the landlord began to be paid (after the landlord’s 
completion of construction of the improvements, estimated to occur over a year later). That 
second half was not paid, and the cooperating broker—the one who had procured and 
represented the tenant—brought an action against the landlord, for its part of that half, about 
$850,000. 
This claim is barely mentioned in the opinion, but it appears that the trial court had ruled that 
the balance of the commission had never become due because the landlord and tenant had 
negotiated a termination of the lease before the tenant ever started paying any rent. Since no one 
appealed that ruling, there was no coverage of that point in the appellate opinion. 
Now, no party is forced to file an appeal just so that I can get answers to questions I might 
have, but I would have greatly wanted to know when and under what circumstances premature 
termination of a lease ends a leasing broker’s entitlement to a commission. In purchase 
situations, brokers frequently do not receive their commissions until close of escrow, but 
maintain, at the same time, that failure to close will not automatically terminate the right to a 
commission. There is a difference between a date of legal entitlement to a commission and the 
date for actual receipt of it, so I have to wonder: Why was the final part of the commission 
denied here, after a ready and able tenant had been signed up? 
From the briefs, I surmise that the trial court accepted the landlord’s contention that the listing 
provision making that second half of the commission “due and payable” when rent 
commenced—rather than just “payable”—meant that the obligation to pay dissolved if the tenant 
was later released from its rent obligations before part of it was paid. But that is a heavy 
significance to impose on those two little words (“due and”); I doubt that most persons in the real 
estate community fully appreciate it. If that is how the distinction now works, then lawyers 
should henceforth make sure that this feature is duly noted in their forms and taught to their 
clients (and new associates). 
Furthermore, in this case, the landlord seems to have been paid some $50 million for letting 
the tenant get off the rent hook. While the trial court held that such money was not rent, it pretty 
clearly looks that it was paid as a substitute for rent (or as a substitute for not having to pay rent), 
rather like the forfeited deposit of a defaulting purchaser that is treated as liquidated damages 
and then usually split between seller and broker in lieu of payment of a full commission, except 
that this money was paid as the result of an entirely consensual arrangement between parties 
(which may make it seem more, rather than less, like rent). Given the result here, attorneys 
representing brokers or the parties they deal with need to put more thought and effort into 
negotiating those “no deal, no commission” provisions that appear in listings. 
This was only a trial court ruling, but its outcome could happen to anybody. 
Disclosure 
The issue that did go up on appeal was the landlord’s claim that the broker knew that the 
tenant was heading toward financial failure but did not disclose that to the landlord. This 
contention was raised in the landlord’s cross-complaint to the above-mentioned broker’s initial 
complaint for the commission, not as a defense to payment of the commission, but rather as a 
basis for affirmative tort liability. In contrast to the undiscussed commission issue, this 
nondisclosure theory was so overkilled in the opinion that we come away not knowing which of 
the many reasons given for its rejection is the one to take seriously and learn from. (The opinion 
makes it hard to tell whether it is a procedural or substantive ruling; it is rife with condemnations 
of the way the theory was pled (“a model of improper pleading”; “allegations [that] are woefully 
deficient”; “pregnant with fatal ambiguities”). I am skeptical, because all counsel were very 
competent and highly regarded real estate attorneys. I will ignore the judicial recriminations and 
focus on the theory itself.) 
The claim was that since the broker had learned before the termination of the lease that the 
tenant was going under, such information should have been disclosed to the landlord. It was 
rejected because this information (1) had come to the cooperating broker (2) by way of a 
confidential communication (3) after the lease had already been executed and (4) had caused no 
legal damage to the landlord (my categories). It is this overabundance of reasons that makes it so 
hard for others to estimate how valid each ground might have been on its own (although I am 
now about to try to do just that). 
Agency 
The broker who had not made the disclosure was the agent of the tenant, not the landlord. (A 
sort of potential dual agency was also claimed, but under a contingency that the court felt free to 
ignore.) Of course, a landlord’s own agent has a fiduciary obligation to pass on to it any 
potentially significant information, but what burden, if any, is imposed on the agent for the other 
party? The landlord’s assertion that the general obligation of truthfulness and honesty covering 
all brokers generated the same disclosure duty on the nonagent broker was rejected, but because 
of all of the other grounds for rejecting the claim, it was not that seriously considered on its own. 
If a cooperating broker presents a buyer or a tenant to the other side while being in possession 
of some unpleasant information about the client, does the failure to mention that constitute 
fraud? I expect that the duty on the side of the seller and her agent not to withhold facts 
regarding defects in the property is matched on the other side as to information about defects in 
the buyer’s (or tenant’s) ability to pay. Saying that this was the cooperating broker rather than 
the listing broker should not end the inquiry as to the scope of disclosure duties, as might seem to 
be implied by this opinion. Certainly, I would not feel comfortable advising a broker client that 
she need not disclose some adverse fact she knows merely because she is on the other side of the 
deal. 
Confidences 
A plausible exception to a duty to disclose often exists when the information comes as a 
confidential communication. Lawyers know not to tell the other side what their own clients have 
admitted to them in confidence, but how true is that for brokers? When a seller tells her broker 
about a concealed defect in the property, is he similarly bound to keep it secret? The opinion says 
that an obligation to disclose in that case would “make it impossible for any principal to conduct 
negotiations through an intermediary,” and that seems inarguable. But does that proposition 
resolve all difficulties? Does it insulate a broker from liability for fraud in all cases, e.g., even if 
he affirmatively responds to a question from the other side with a lie because his principal has 
told him to do so? Should he quit his job instead, as the opinion acknowledges? What if he is a 
dual agent, as brokers so often love to become? Concluding that the information about a client’s 
financial woes came from confidential communications may be only the beginning of all that an 
attorney needs to know when her broker client inquires as to the scope of its disclosure duty to 
the other party in the deal. 
Duration 
How long after the initial stage of having made an offer do disclosure duties last? Are those 
duties the same for matters learned after the offer was accepted but before the escrow has closed? 
Do any duties continue after close of escrow? In this case, the lease had been signed before the 
broker learned about the trouble, but the rent payments had not yet started. Nor, obviously, had 
the brokers received the second half of their commission. Nor had the termination and restructure 
negotiations commenced. The court’s observation that the critical conduct did not occur until 
after execution of the lease may be enough to support its conclusion that there was therefore no 
fraudulent inducement to enter into a lease, but it does not support much else. I remain unsure of 
what to tell a broker as to how long afterwards he can safely keep his mouth shut. 
Damage 
The landlord claimed that he could have made a much better settlement with the tenant if he 
had been told earlier, i.e., he could have found a new tenant and made more money. The court’s 
response that he was not legally free to do so until this lease was terminated seems glib, since 
there had been real fraud (e.g., proven intentional disloyalty by one broker or affirmative 
misstatements by the other). I think that belatedly informing could be deemed material in a 
volatile market. When to begin worrying that an existing tenant may be in trouble and when to 
start looking for a replacement are matters that many landlords may expect their rental agents to 
handle for them. Attorneys should advise brokers that they may not be excused from their 
obligations to inform their principals just because they don’t know what they could do about it if 
they knew. 
Attorney Fees 
The landlord’s motion for attorney fees in defeating the broker’s original commission claim 
was rejected on the ground that the clause in the listing agreement covered only “litigation 
between the parties hereto,” which did not include the cooperating broker. In affirming that 
decision, the court rejected what it called the “playground justice” argument that unjustified fees 
can be awarded just because the other party has similarly requested them—a holding that should 
remind litigation counsel to warn clients about the potential unprofitability of some claims. (The 
landlord’s attorney fees were set at $496,000 for fighting the broker’s $850,000 claim.) 
There seems to have been no claim for attorney fees by the tenant’s broker for defeating the 
landlord’s nondisclosure cross-complaint. Perhaps an economic calculation convinced them that 
they were better off having both fee claims rejected rather than accepted and somehow offsetting 
each other. Since I have no idea how an attorney fee award would have been calculated had such 
fees been covered in the contract and had each side prevailed on its respective claim, that is one 
part of the decision I cannot complain about 
 
Blickman Turkus, LP v MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 CA4th 858, 76 CR3d 325 
Commercial Property Services (CPS) entered into a listing agreement, on commission (to be 
paid one half on lease execution and one half on commencement of rent), to obtain a lessee for 
buildings to be built on property owned and managed, respectively, by MF Downtown 
Sunnyvale, LLC and Mozart Development Co. (collectively, Mozart). In early 2001, Mozart 
signed written leases with Handspring, Inc. for two buildings to be completed to Handspring’s 
specifications by approximately September 2002. Handspring’s obligations were secured by 
letters of credit. Blickman Turkus, LP, doing business as BT Commercial Real Estate (BTC), 
represented Handspring in the lease transaction. Handspring began to have financial difficulties 
beginning in October 2001. Mozart learned of Handspring’s financial problems in August 2002, 
when it was contacted by another agent for Handspring to negotiate a termination of the leases. 
In exchange for termination of the leases, Mozart received stock, notes, and cash, and was 
permitted to draw on the letters of credit for a total consideration valued at more than 
$50,000,000.  
BTC claimed that it was the procuring agent and entitled to a commission under Mozart’s 
listing agreement with CPS. Claiming that Mozart had paid the first half of the commission but 
had refused to pay the second, BTC asserted claims for breach of contract, the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, an implied promise to complete the lease transaction, and tortious 
interference with advantageous relationship. Mozart cross-claimed, alleging that BTC had been 
aware of Handspring’s financial problems as early as October 2001 and had failed to inform 
Mozart, which suffered damages as a result. Mozart and BTC both successfully challenged the 
other’s claims before trial, and the superior court entered judgment that neither party take 
anything. Mozart’s motions to vacate the judgment and for attorney fees were denied. Both sides 
appealed. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment. 
The fatal flaw of Mozart’s cross-claims was that BTC had no duty to disclose to Mozart the 
information about Handspring’s financial problems—whether as agent for Handspring or, 
hypothetically, for Mozart or as a result of representations made at the time Handspring entered 
into the lease. Mozart never believed or rationally could have believed that BTC represented 
Mozart’s interests. Moreover, there was no evidence in the record of any basis for Mozart to 
expect that BTC would disclose Handspring’s confidential information other than as Handspring 
might direct. Nor was there any duty for BTC to correct statements, made before execution of the 
lease, that allegedly became incorrect thereafter. Mozart sought to recover for alleged harm not 
in entering into the lease, but from the failure to withdraw from the lease sooner than it did. 
Mozart’s claims based on dual agency also failed because even if BTC were a dual agent, its 
obligation, when faced with a conflict between two principals, would be to withdraw from the 
representation rather than to disclose confidential information. Mozart’s claim for attorney fees 
failed as well. Even if BTC had succeeded in its claims, it would not have been entitled to 
attorney fees because it was not a party to the contract (between Mozart and CPS) containing the 
attorney fee provision. 
 
